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reduces firms’ likelihood of defaulting on their debt. In particular, we examine whether
it reduces default risk during increased economic uncertainty and various external shocks.
Our results confirm that a stronger insolvency regime moderates the adverse effects of eco-
nomic shocks on firms’ default risk. The effects are more pronounced for firms in the top
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rights influence firms’ default risk, including dependence on external finance, corporate
leverage, and managerial ethics. Our main results are robust to an alternative measure of
default risk, inclusion of currency and sovereign debt crisis episodes, and alternative esti-
mations.
Keywords: Insolvency; Bankruptcy; Default risk; Economic policy uncertainty; Sovereign
debt crisis; Currency crisis
JEL Codes: G30; G32; G33
∗The authors are grateful for the suggestions and comments provided by V. Ravi Anshuman, Pavel Chakraborty,
Sergio Muro, Pranav Singh and participants in the IIMA-World Bank Research Conference on Financial Distress,
Bankruptcy, and Corporate Finance. Funding from IIM Ahmedabad and UTI Asset Management Company is
acknowledged. Usual disclaimer applies.
†Finance, Accounting, and Control Area, Indian Institute of Management, Kozhikode, Kerala, India. Email:
balagopal@iimk.ac.in
‡Economics Area, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India. Email: sanketm@iima.ac.in
§Corresponding author
1. Introduction
Institutional measures that protect the interest of various stakeholders in a financial contract are
often considered as means to reduce financing frictions and, consequently, improve contracting
outcomes of various parties. There are two broad views on how creditor rights impact firms’
risk-taking, investment, and financing. One view holds that enhanced creditor rights would
improve their debt financing capacity by increasing the availability of private credit by the
financial system (Djankov, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2007). The second view holds that stronger
creditor rights would deter firms from undertaking riskier investments (Acharya, Amihud, &
Litov, 2011) and lower their leverage (Cho, El Ghoul, Guedhami, & Suh, 2014). Claessens and
Klapper (2005) argue that ex-ante incentive effects of stronger creditor rights and insolvency
systems encourage less risky behavior by firms, thereby reducing their chances of financial
distress. In this study, we build on the latter view by empirically examining whether enhanced
creditor rights reduce firms’ ex-ante risk of debt default during episodes of policy uncertainty
and economic shocks.
We examine the role of creditor rights in influencing firm behavior across advanced and
emerging economies by using their disclosed financial information. First, we consider how
institutional changes in the insolvency framework, which improve creditor rights, affect firms’
behavior in terms of their risk of defaulting on their debt obligations. Second, we consider
whether an improvement in the insolvency regime moderates the effect of economic shocks
on their risk of debt distress. Our emphasis on firms’ response to economic shocks as an
outcome of creditor rights differs from existing literature that considers the impact of creditor
rights on risky investments (Acharya et al., 2011); on firms’ capital structure decisions (Cho
et al., 2014; Gilson, 1997); and on private credit across countries (Djankov et al., 2007). We
also complement Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe, and Soto (2002) who find a positive effect of
bankruptcy reforms on the recovery from a debt crisis.
We examine the above questions by considering the association between the strength of
insolvency regimes, economic shocks, and firms’ likelihood of financial distress. Our results
point to a negative association between the strength of the insolvency framework, a measure
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of creditor rights, and firms’ risk of debt default. Our finding is consistent with prior studies
that show an inverse relationship between creditor rights and firms’ risk-taking (Acharya et al.,
2011; Cho et al., 2014). We also find that stronger insolvency regimes moderate the adverse
effects of heightened economic policy uncertainty and economic shocks on firms’ risk of de-
fault. This finding suggests that when the insolvency regime is stronger, borrowers are less
likely to take on additional risk during adverse economic shocks. One possible channel is the
impairment in borrowers’ collateral during economic downturns, which can raise the agency
costs of financing (Gertler & Bernanke, 1989) and, consequently, increase the likelihood of
liquidation under stronger creditor rights. This can discourage managers acting on behalf of
the shareholders from taking on risks that can increase the possibility of a debt default (Adler,
1991).1
Our results on the positive role of the insolvency framework during adverse economic
events are tested with the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) measure, a country-specific mea-
sure of uncertain government policies, developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). Episodes
of higher economic policy uncertainty can lead to a delay in private sector investments and af-
fect consumption. In addition to EPU, we employ other measures of country-specific economic
shocks, such as currency crises and sovereign debt crises to validate our results. We also ob-
serve the moderating effect of stronger insolvency regimes during those crises periods. The
above findings also hold for an alternative measure of default risk, the market signal proba-
bility of default (MSPD) developed by Standard and Poor’s, which is based on a structural
model.
Further, we find that both the average effect of a better insolvency regime, as well as its
moderating effect during economic shocks is higher for larger firms. This may be explained by
the propensity of professional managers of larger firms, who enjoy more control rights given the
diffused shareholder ownership structure that exists in such firms, to maintain their reputational
capital. A stronger insolvency regime can discourage managers from taking risky decisions
as they stand to lose the private benefits associated with their control rights in the event of
1Adler (1991) argues that while managers of an insolvent firm may take on greater investment risk prior to
final bankruptcy resolution, ex ante they would reduce their risk in order to avoid bankruptcy (see also Acharya et
al. (2011)).
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insolvency during a downturn (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2003). In smaller firms, the decisions of the
managers and shareholders might be closely aligned, and hence, these firms may not pass up
riskier investment activities when the creditor rights are higher. Our key findings hold for all
subsamples excluding the United States and Japan.
We also consider the potential channels through which improved creditor rights influence
firms’ default risk. Using a measure of external financial dependence developed by Rajan and
Zingales (1998), we find a larger moderating effect of a better insolvency regime on firms’
risk of defaulting on debt obligations during economic shocks for industrial sectors with higher
external finance dependence. This suggests that the strength of the insolvency framework plays
a larger role for firms with higher reliance on the financial system compared to their internal
cash flows. We find that better insolvency regimes lower firms’ likelihood of default through a
reduction in leverage, an indicator of their risk-taking behavior (Acharya et al., 2011).
While our primary emphasis is on how creditor rights alter firm behavior, it is possible that
the results are influenced by their efforts to reduce agency costs in financial contracting. One
such signaling mechanism is the ethical behavior of corporate managers, which can help to
mitigate the agency costs arising out of asymmetric information (Huang, Louwers, Moffitt, &
Zhang, 2008; Husted, 2007; Van Oosterhout, Heugens, & Kaptein, 2006). As expected, we
find that both a stronger insolvency framework and a measure of firms’ ethics have a negative
association with their default risk. However, the interaction of the two suggests that a stronger
insolvency framework can result in lower risk-taking even when corporate governance is rela-
tively weak, particularly during periods of greater economic uncertainty.
This study contributes to the literature on the role of regulatory institutions in improving
financial contracting outcomes in several ways. To our knowledge, this is the first study that
considers the role of the insolvency regime in mitigating the risk of default during economic
shocks. We extend the existing literature on creditor rights and firm behavior by examining
the ex-ante behavior of firms during economic shocks for a large sample of firms across coun-
tries with varying creditor rights. Second, we directly examine firms’ default risk rather than
investment and capital structure decisions that influence firm risk. Our findings on default risk
corroborate earlier studies on the relationship between creditor rights and risk-taking (Acharya
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et al., 2011; Eckbo & Thorburn, 2003; Gilson, 1997). Third, we employ a distance-to-frontier
measure of creditor rights that is based on the time, cost, and outcome of insolvency pro-
ceedings, which determine the recovery rates in bankruptcy (World Bank, 2019). Overall, our
findings contribute to the literature on firm behavior in response to changes in regulations that
improve creditor rights.
The next section discusses the literature on creditor rights, firm risk-taking, and economic
policy uncertainty. The subsequent section discusses the empirical methodology and data used
for this study. Our main results and robustness to alternative specifications and subsamples are
discussed next. The last section concludes with relevance for policies on creditor rights.
2. Related Literature
Our study relates to a large literature on the role of creditor rights in financial contracting,
capital market development, and risk-taking by firms. It also relates to the literature on the role
of economic policy uncertainty and economic shocks in financial outcomes, cost of capital,
investment, and employment. These two strands of literature are discussed below.
2.1. Creditor rights and firm financing
The literature on the impact of creditor rights on firms can be classified into two strands,
the supply-side arguments and the demand-side arguments. In the supply-side strand, studies
predominantly examine the effect of improved creditor rights on credit supply and economic
growth. The seminal study of La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) shows
that the quality of law enforcement is an important consideration in the development of capital
markets. The authors show that the development of both equity and debt markets of civil law
countries lag behind those of common law countries. Djankov et al. (2007) find that credit
to the private sector goes up in countries with stronger legal systems that protect the rights of
the creditors. Rodano, Serrano-Velarde, and Tarantino (2016) find that reforms in Italy, which
strengthened creditor rights in liquidation, led to a significant reduction in the cost of bank
financing and an increase in firm investment. Bergoeing, Loayza, and Repetto (2004) argue
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that weaker bankruptcy regimes distort the reallocation of resources across economic units and
result in slower growth. Bergoeing et al. (2002) find that bankruptcy reforms in Chile helped
in a faster recovery after a crisis in the early 1980s.
Studies relating to the demand-side view examine both the financing and the investment
choices made by firms. Gilson (1997) finds evidence that bankruptcy costs can induce managers
to maintain a capital structure with lower leverage to avoid the possibility of financial distress.
In a cross-country study, Acharya et al. (2011) find that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy
reduce corporate risk-taking and leverage. The authors find that firms reduce risk through
diversification of value-reducing acquisitions. In a cross-country setting, Seifert and Gonenc
(2012) show that firms based in countries with stronger creditor rights reduce cash-flow risk
and, consequently, their R&D expenses. Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2008) show that the
likelihood of distress among Belgian small and medium-sized firms reduced significantly after
the introduction of an insolvency reform in 1997.
Stronger creditor rights can reduce riskier activities and potentially reduce innovation and
investment. Acharya and Subramanian (2009), using patent data, argue that stronger creditor
rights would induce firms to shun innovation. Another strand argues for the presence of man-
agerial conservatism in firms’ investment choices to maintain their reputational capital (Eckbo
& Thorburn, 2003; Hirshleifer & Thakor, 1992; Zwiebel, 1995). Zwiebel (1995) argues that
managers refrain from riskier investments due to fear of reputational loss. In Sweden, Eckbo
and Thorburn (2003) show that private benefits of control derived by the management encour-
age them to make conservative investment decisions in the face of a stringent bankruptcy pro-
cess, which can force them out of their jobs. Chava and Roberts (2008) empirically show that
firms reduce their investments in response to the threat by creditors to accelerate the loan re-
payments. The study finds evidence that contingent control rights of the creditors facilitated by
the enforcement of debt covenants mitigate distortions in firms’ investment decisions that arise
from asymmetric information.
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2.2. Economic uncertainty and firm outcomes
Next, we review the emerging literature on economic policy uncertainty and its implications
for real-sector outcomes, equity market responses, and bank credit supply. Higher economic
policy uncertainty tends to be associated with adverse macroeconomic performance in the form
of lower output, investment, and employment (Baker et al., 2016). The authors develop a text-
based economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index, which relies on the frequency of certain key-
words that appear in articles in leading newspapers. Bloom (2009) uses a structural framework
to analyze the impact of uncertainty shocks and finds that higher uncertainty shocks result in
temporary delays in investment and employment generation by firms, and a fall in productivity
growth. Drobetz, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Janzen (2018) find that higher policy uncertainty
weakens the negative impact of the cost of capital on investments. The authors conclude that
higher economic policy uncertainties distort the relationship between capital investments and
the cost of capital.
Brogaard and Detzel (2015) find that equity portfolios with higher sensitivity to economic
policy uncertainty underperform those with lower sensitivity. Using equity market data from
the United States, Nagar, Schoenfeld, and Wellman (2019) show that firms face higher infor-
mation asymmetries in the form of higher bid-ask spreads and decreased stock price reactions
to earnings surprises during heightened economic policy uncertainty. In a general equilibrium
setting, Pastor and Veronesi (2012) predict a larger fall in stock prices on an average during
greater uncertainty about government policies. Brogaard and Detzel (2015) show that an in-
crease in economic policy uncertainty is associated with a contemporaneous decrease in market
returns and an increase in future three-month excess returns.
Bordo, Duca, and Koch (2016) find that economic policy uncertainty negatively affected ag-
gregate bank credit growth in the United States during the 2007-13 period. The weaker credit
supply through the bank lending channel resulted in lower economic growth. The authors find
that the effects of policy uncertainty are more pronounced in larger, less well-capitalized, and
less liquid banks. Chi and Li (2017) find evidence that economic uncertainty is related to higher
non-performing loans in China. Berger, Guedhami, Kim, and Li (2018) report that higher eco-
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nomic policy uncertainty is associated with greater liquidity hoarding by banks. Boumparis,
Milas, and Panagiotidis (2017) find that lower-rated sovereigns in Europe experience a larger
negative impact on their creditworthiness during heightened economic policy uncertainty com-
pared to better rated countries.
3. Methodology and Data
3.1. Empirical methodology
Drawing on literature that suggests that improved creditor rights may reduce the risk of debt
default by increasing credit discipline among firms, we model the effect of creditor rights on
firms’ default risk using the following estimation equation:
DefaultRiskScoreit = α0 + α1Insol scorejt−1 +
∑
k
α2,kXi,kt−1
+
∑
l
α3,lYj,lt−1 + µi + τt + ǫit
(1)
where DefaultRiskScoreit is the default risk score, proxied by Z-score, of the firm i in
year t. Higher the default risk score, the lower the chances of a default. Insol scorejt−1 is
a score that captures the relative strength of the insolvency standards for the country j for
the year t − 1. X is a set of firm-specific control variables that affect the default risk of the
firm. Specifically, we control for the asset size, future and present growth opportunities through
the market to book ratio and sales growth, respectively, availability of tangible collateral, and
operational cash flows of the firm.
Y is a set of country-specific variables that affect the default risk of the firm. µi captures the
firm-specific time-invariant factors and subsumes any other higher order time-invariant effects,
such as industry and country fixed effects. τt captures any year-specific exogenous shocks that
affect all the firms. In alternative specifications, we control for Industry × Y ear fixed effects
to account for any change in industry-level time-variant fluctuations that could affect the default
risk of firms in a specific industry (Gormley &Matsa, 2014). All standard errors are clustered at
firm-level and controlled for heteroskedasticity, as suggested by Petersen (2009) for corporate
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finance applications.
Literature argues that economic policy uncertainty can adversely impact firm performance.
In the next specification, we test whether this effect varies with the strength of creditor rights.
We employ the following empirical specification to test the moderating role of the insolvency
framework during episodes of policy uncertainty shocks.
DefaultRiskScoreit = β0 + β1Insol scorejt−1 + β2Shockjt−1 × Insol scorejt−1
+ β3Shockjt−1 +
∑
s
β4,sXi,st−1 +
∑
l
β5,lYj,lt−1 + µi + τt + ǫit
(2)
The dependent variable is theDefaultRiskScore. The Shock variable is based on the eco-
nomic policy uncertainty (EPU ) index of Baker et al. (2016), currency crisis (Curr crisis),
and sovereign debt crisis (Debt crisis). The detailed definition of the Shock variables is pro-
vided in Table 1. The key explanatory variable is the interaction term Insol score×Shock. As
we expect better creditor rights to reduce the effect of shocks on firm default risk, we expect β2
to be positive and significant. We employ several economic shock proxies to capture the effect
of creditor rights on firm default risk in the presence of economic uncertainties.
All other variables are similar to those shown in Equation 1. In alternative estimations, we
interact firm size with Shock × Insol score to examine its effect on the moderating effects of
the insolvency score during economic shocks. As the variation of the triple interaction term is
at the firm-level, we control for country-year fixed effects in these estimations. Country-year
dummies capture the effects of any unobserved yearly variation at the country level (Gormley
& Matsa, 2014).
3.2. Data
We obtain the data on firm-level financial information from the Worldscope database of Thom-
son Reuters. In our analysis, we consider only non-financial manufacturing firms (SIC 2 digit
20-39). Our baseline sample covers firm performance for 60 countries over a 15 year period
from 2003 to 2017, determined by the availability of the information on creditor rights. All
firm-level variables are derived from the field items in the Worldscope database. Detailed defi-
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nition of the firm-level variables is shown in Table 1.
The primary dependent variable Z-score is derived based on the disclosed firm financial
information (Altman, 1968) (detailed definition in Table 1). This measure of firm default risk
has found wide acceptance in the finance literature (Almeida, Hankins, & Williams, 2017;
Asness, Frazzini, & Pedersen, 2019; Eisdorfer, 2008; Fan, Huang, & Zhu, 2013). Since the
Z-score is based primarily on accounting information, it offers wider coverage as compared to
other measures of financial distress. We also employ an alternative measure of default risk, the
market signal probability of default (MSPD) developed by Standard & Poor’s, which is based
on a structural model and ranges from 0 to 100. We transform this variable to MSPD inv,
calculated as 100 -MSPD, in order to be in the same direction as the Z-score.
The key explanatory variable that captures the strength of creditor rights, Insol score,
is obtained from the Doing Business database of the World Bank. The Insol score is a
distance-to-frontier measure ranging from 0 to 100 based on the time, cost, and outcome of the
insolvency proceedings that determine the recovery rate in bankruptcy, as well as the strength
of the legal framework for liquidation and reorganization (World Bank, 2019). This measure,
available since 2003, is based on annual surveys of local insolvency practitioners and informa-
tion on laws, regulations, and insolvency systems across countries.
The measures of economic shocks are obtained from various publicly available sources. Our
main measure, the economic policy uncertainty (EPU ) index, is obtained from the database
maintained by Baker et al. (2016). This measure on policy-related economic uncertainty has
been used in many recent studies (Bordo et al., 2016; Drobetz et al., 2018; Harvey & Liu,
2019; Nagar et al., 2019). The information on currency crisis and sovereign debt crisis is
obtained from the Global Crises Data based on Reinhart and Reinhart (2015); Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009), maintained by the Behavioral Finance and Financial Stability (BFFS) Project
database of the Harvard Business School.2
The country-level control variables, obtained from the World Development Indicators of
the World Bank, include GDP growth, the logarithm of per capita GDP, and the ratio of private
2We do not include banking crises episodes in this study since such events can be potentially endogenous
to the likelihood of debt default by firms, which can, in turn, increase the non-performing loans of the banking
system.
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credit to GDP (an indicator of the level of financial development). In alternative estimations, we
employ Firm ethics, an indicator of the ethical practices in firms, obtained from the Global
Competitiveness Report database of theWorld Economic Forum.3 The analysis with firm ethics
helps us to consider the potential substitutability between creditor rights and managerial ethics
in influencing firms’ default risk.
All firm-specific variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. The final estimation
sample based on the data availability of the baseline specification shown in Equation 1 has
103,576 firm-year observations for 13,019 unique firms across 60 countries. The summary
statistics of the variables employed in the study is shown in Table 2. The average firm has a
Z-score of 3.19 andMSPD inv of 97.33%, indicating a relatively low likelihood of a default
during the estimation period.
The average size of the representative firm in our sample is $282 million. Such a firm
has a mean sales growth of 6.3% and a market-to-book (M/B) ratio of 2.31, suggesting future
growth opportunities. The average firm has positive operational cash flow and has about 31% of
its assets as fixed assets. The firms experienced a currency crisis during 14% of the estimation
period. In Table 3, we show the industry-level observations and the corresponding mean and
standard deviation of the default score (Z-score). There is significant variation in the default
risk scores within and across industries subgroups. The least mean Z-score is for the Textile
mill products and the highest mean Z-score is for the Tobacco Products industry group.
4. Results
4.1. Creditor rights and likelihood of debt distress
The findings of the estimation model shown in Equation 1 are presented in Table 4. The results
of the estimation in column (1) suggest that higher the quality of the insolvency process in a
country, lower the default risk (higher value of Z-score) of the firms in that country. In the
baseline specifications, we control for fixed effects at the firm, year, and industry-year levels
3This factor is a part of the Private Institutions subgroup of the Institutions pillar of the Global Competitiveness
Report.
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and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. In column (2), we additionally control for firm-
specific factors that are known to affect the creditworthiness of the firms. The magnitude of the
insolvency variable remains stable with the inclusion of these firm controls. In column (3), we
control for country-specific factors. The results in column (3) suggest that a 10-unit increase
in insolvency score (which is measured on a scale of 0-100) increases the Z-score score by
0.07 units. This represents a 2.2% decline compared to the mean Z-score of 3.19, suggesting
that an improvement in the insolvency score has an economically significant effect in terms of
reducing the risk of debt default by firms.
We further examine how this effect of the insolvency regime varies by the size of the firms
in our sample. The findings in column (4) are in line with our expectation that stronger creditor
rights dissuade larger firms from riskier investments and decisions that increase the chances of
distress. We find that the negative association between stronger creditor rights and the likeli-
hood of default is driven by the larger firms. The effects are higher by about 45% (0.010 vs.
0.007) as compared to the smaller firms in our sample (see column (4) in Table 4).
The coefficients of the control variables are as expected. These results suggest that smaller
firms, firms with higher cash flows, and those with higher growth opportunities (higherMarket-
to-Book ratio) tend to have higher Z-scores, indicating a lower propensity to default. Firms with
higher tangible capital have a lower Z-score, which may be explained by a greater reliance on
debt financing secured by the firms’ tangible assets. The coefficients of country-specific factors
indicate that firms in countries with higher GDP growth, higher per capita income, and lower
private credit to GDP (implying a lower debt overhang) tend to have a lower likelihood of
default.
Our results are robust to the exclusion of the United States and Japan, both advanced
economies that constitute about 35% of the observation in our sample (see columns (5) and
(6)). These countries have been excluded in robustness tests in earlier studies on creditor rights
to ensure that large advanced economies do not drive the main results (Cho et al., 2014).4 The
coefficient of Insol score is significant and positive, albeit smaller in magnitude as compared
to the full sample. However, in the restricted sample, we do not find any significant difference
4Our main results hold in terms of sign and significance even if we exclude China, the largest developing
country, along with the United States and Japan.
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in the effect of the insolvency regime between the larger and the smaller firms.
Next, we estimate Equation 2 in which we test whether firms in countries with stronger
insolvency framework would be able to perform better during heightened economic uncertainty.
In order to capture large policy uncertainty shocks, we create EPU shock, a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 if the EPU index is one standard deviation above its average value
and 0 otherwise. We interact this variable with the Insol score. The positive coefficient of
the interaction term Insol score × EPU shock, shown in Table 5 column (1), suggests that
the likelihood of debt distress of firms is moderated during episodes of heightened economic
policy uncertainty in countries with stronger creditor rights. A one standard deviation increase
in the creditor rights score (equivalent to 27.9 unit increase) moderates the adverse effect of an
EPU shock on firm’s default risk score by about 0.14, which is about 5.5% of the Z-score of
the median firm in our sample. As expected, the negative and significant coefficient of the level
effect of EPU shock suggests that the default risk of firms is higher (lower Z-score) during
episodes of heightened economic policy uncertainty.
The finding that better insolvency regimes moderate the adverse effects of higher economic
policy uncertainty on firms’ default risk is corroborated for an alternative measure of heightened
economic uncertainty (EPU shock alt) that takes the value 1 for the top quartile of the EPU
distribution (see column (2) of Table 5). The moderating effect of creditor rights is consistent
for the restricted sample that excludes the United States and Japan, with the magnitude of
the moderating effect being slightly higher for EPU shock and similar for EPU shock alt
compared to the full sample (see columns (3) and (4)).
4.2. Size-effects in firms’ response to creditor rights
Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2006) suggest that weak creditor rights can incen-
tivize firms that are dependent on external financing to increase their size. Larger firms may
benefit from internalization of the allocation of capital, particularly when there is ineffective
monitoring by intermediaries or as a consequence of weak legal systems for enforcement of
creditor rights. In this section, we attempt to understand whether the moderating effect of in-
solvency regimes on default risk during heightened economic uncertainty is driven by larger or
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smaller firms.
We classify the firms into two groups using a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
the asset size is larger than the mean asset size for the sample and 0 otherwise. The result
with country-level controls is reported in column (1) of Table 6. In column (2), we include
country-year dummies that capture any country-specific time-varying effects. In the latter spec-
ification, country-specific level terms, such as Insol score and EPU shock, are subsumed by
the country-year dummies and, consequently, only interaction terms that vary at a firm-level
survive in the regression analysis.
The coefficient of the triple interaction term Insol score × EPU shock × Large size is
positive and significant, as shown in Table 6, suggesting that the moderating effects discussed
in the earlier subsection are driven by larger firms. This finding is consistent with the argument
of Eckbo and Thorburn (2003) that stronger creditor rights can dissuade managers from taking
riskier decisions as they may lose the private benefits associated with higher control rights, a
facet of large-sized firms with diffused ownership (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). The findings are
consistent for the restricted sample of observations that excludes the firms from the US and
Japan (see columns (3) and (4)).
4.3. Alternative measure of default risk
Our primary measure of default risk Z-score offers computational ease but suffers from some
limitations as it is predominantly a book-value measure and does not take into account other
factors that could affect the creditworthiness of the firm. In order to address this concern, we
test the robustness of our main results for an alternative proxy for default risk, MSPD inv,
computed based on a proprietary structural model of default risk. Therefore, the higher the
MSPD inv, the lower the chances of default. One limitation of the MSPD inv data is that
it is available only since 2013 and for a relatively small subsample of 6,432 observations for
1,617 unique firms.
We then re-estimate Equation 2 withMSPD inv as the dependent variable. The results of
the estimation shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 are consistent with the findings shown
in Table 5 for EPU shock and EPU shock alt. The coefficient of the interaction terms that
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captures the role of better creditor rights during periods of shock is positive and significant.
A one standard deviation increase in the insolvency framework of the country reduces the
probability of default by 0.45 percentage points. Our findings remain robust for the subsample
excluding the United States and Japan, as reported in columns (3) and (4).
4.4. Alternative measure of economic shocks
In order to test whether our results for firms’ default risk during economic policy shocks is
robust to alternative measure of country-specific shocks, we employ two measures, namely, the
presence of currency crisis in a country and the presence of sovereign debt crisis in a country.
The results of the estimation in Table 8 suggest that the moderating effects found for periods
of higher economic policy uncertainty is prevalent during periods of currency crisis (see coeffi-
cient of the interaction term Insol score× Curr crisis in column (1) for the full sample and
column (3) for the subsample excluding the United States and Japan). A similar result is ob-
served when firms are faced with sovereign debt crisis. The coefficient of the interaction term
Insol score × Debt crisis in columns (2) and (4) is positive and significant. A comparison
of the coefficients of the interaction terms above suggests that the effect of creditor rights is
higher during sovereign debt crisis as compared to currency crisis.
4.5. Continuous measure of economic policy uncertainty
Next, in order to address the concerns regarding the choice and construction of the binary
EPU shock variable, we re-estimate Equation 2 with the continuous measure of economic
policy uncertainty EPU of Baker et al. (2016). The results of the re-estimation in column (1)
for the full sample and column (3) for the subsample excluding the United States and Japan
capture the effect of stronger creditor rights during higher policy uncertainty. Similarly, in
columns (2) and (4), we estimate the large-size effect described in the earlier sections. The
results are consistent with our findings for the discrete measure of economic uncertainty shocks
reported in Table 5 and Table 6.
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4.6. Role of alternative institutional factors
Although our focus is on whether a stronger insolvency regime influences firms’ behavior in
response to changes in creditor rights, the prevailing ethical practices of managers in a country
may help to reduce agency costs in debt contracts. Hence, we employ Firm ethics, a measure
of ethical practices of firms provided by the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Eco-
nomic Forum. We re-estimate the model shown in Equation 1 by interacting the Insol score
with the Firm ethics measure described above. The results of the estimation are reported in
Table 10 column (1) for the full sample and column (3) for the subsample that excludes the
United States and Japan. The level terms of both Firm ethics and Insol score are positive
and significant, suggesting that both these institutional variables lower the default risk of firms.
The findings on the effect of Firm ethics is consistent with the arguments advanced by earlier
studies that ethical practices in firms reduce the information asymmetry in financial contract-
ing (Huang et al., 2008; Husted, 2007; Van Oosterhout et al., 2006). However, the interaction
between creditor rights and firm ethics is negative and significant, suggesting that the strength
of the insolvency regime and firm ethics may act as substitutes in influencing firm behavior.
Additionally, we estimate the incremental effects of Firm ethics during episodes of higher
economic policy uncertainty. The results in columns (2) and (4) of Table 10 show that the
coefficient of the interaction term Firm ethics × EPU shock is positive and significant,
suggesting that ethical practices in firms have a positive effect on firm default risk during
periods of economic policy shocks. This finding is consistent with the effects observed for
Insol score× EPU shock. However, the coefficients of the triple interaction Insol score×
Firm ethics×EPU shock suggest that Insol score and Firm ethicsmay act as substitutes
in moderating the adverse effects of economic policy shocks.
4.7. Channels of firm responses to improved creditor rights
While we find evidence substantiating our hypothesis that creditor rights moderate the adverse
effects of economic shocks on firms’ default risk, it is important to explore the potential chan-
nels through which creditor rights can affect the risk of debt default during heightened policy
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uncertainty. First, we examine the role of dependence of firms on external finance. The measure
of external financial dependence (EFD) is based on the seminal work of Rajan and Zingales
(1998). The variable that is computed at the firm-level captures the amount of the capital ex-
penditure that is not financed by internally generated cash flows. We aggregate this measure
at the industry-level by taking the median value of EFD for each of the 2-digit SIC industry
sectors. We classify the industries in our sample into two groups based on their dependency on
external finance.
We re-estimate Equation 2 for the two groups of firms belonging to industries with low
(below median) and high (above median) values of EFD. The results of the estimations shown
in columns (1) and (2) of Table 11 for high and low EFD, respectively, suggest that the mod-
erating effect of Insol score is more pronounced in the case of firms belonging to industries
with relatively high dependence on external finance. This finding suggests that the importance
of creditor rights is likely to be germane for firms that rely on external sources of financing as
compared to those that rely mostly on internal sources. This is consistent with a larger role of
creditor rights in reducing financing frictions when a firm has higher reliance on external debt
financing. A similar result is observed for the restricted subsample that excludes the United
States and Japan, shown in columns (3) and (4) for high and low EFD, respectively.
Next, we examine the role of leverage, identified as one of the primary causes of financial
distress (Andrade & Kaplan, 1998), and cash holdings in the response of firms to an improved
insolvency framework. Strong creditor rights have been associated with lower leverage in sev-
eral studies (Acharya et al., 2011; Cho et al., 2014). In a similar vein, better creditor rights are
linked to lower cash holdings given the precautionary motive of riskier firms (Huang, Elkinawy,
& Jain, 2013). Financially constrained firms with high hedging needs have a strong propensity
to save cash out of a firm’s cash flows (Acharya, Almeida, & Campello, 2007).
We employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation to understand the channels through
which improved creditor rights influence firms’ risk-taking. In the first stage, we regress con-
temporaneous values of leverage and cash holdings on the Insol score and Insol score ×
EPU shock. In the second stage, we regress Z-score on leverage and cash. Since Z-score
includes market value leverage, we also estimate the second stage equation for a variant of Z-
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score that excludes this component (see MacKie-Mason (1990)). The first stage results shown
in Table 12 column (1) suggest that firms on average reduce their cash holdings during an eco-
nomic shock in order to wade over the crisis. However, we do not find the interaction term to
be significant, suggesting that a stronger insolvency framework does not play an important role
in moderating the adverse effects of economic policy uncertainty on cash holdings.
The results reported in column (2) suggest that firms’ leverage increases (lower value of
Mkt leverage inv) during economic policy shocks. The interaction term Insol score ×
EPU shock is positive and significant, supporting the argument that a stronger insolvency
regime induces firms to reduce their leverage during economic uncertainty shocks. The second-
stage results for the Z-score in column (3) and a measure of Z-score without the market-value
leverage component in column (4) suggest that the moderating effect of Insol score during
EPU shock acts through the leverage channel.
4.8. Revised measure of insolvency
One possible concern regarding the measure employed to capture the strength of the insolvency
regime is a change in methodology undertaken by the World Bank’sDoing Business report in
2015. This change in methodology incorporates some subjective components such as the effi-
cacy of the legal system in the country, in addition to the time, cost, and outcome of insolvency
proceedings that determine the recovery rates in bankruptcy used in the earlier methodology.
In order to address this concern, we extend the insolvency score from 2015 onward with the
distance-to-frontier methodology employed until 2014. The new measure Insol score ext is
calculated by normalizing the recovery rate in the year twith the maximum recovery rate across
the full sample of countries for all years such that the index ranges from 0 to 100. The new
measure that captures the distance to frontier is employed in the estimations shown in Table 13.
We re-estimate Equation 2 for both Z-score as well as MSPD inv. The results for the inter-
action term Insol score ext × EPU shock in column (1) for full sample and column (3) for
the subsample excluding the United States and Japan are very similar in sign and magnitude
as that in Table 5. Similarly, the interaction terms in columns (2) and (4) for MSPD inv are
similar to those in Table 7.
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4.9. Extended sample with service sector firms
We have included manufacturing firms in the analysis so far in order to have a relatively ho-
mogenous sample of firms. The default risk score that is used in our analysis was developed
by Altman (1968) for manufacturing firms. However, this measure has also been used for ser-
vices firms in recent studies (see, for instance, Eisdorfer (2008) and Acharya, Bharath, and
Srinivasan (2007)). In this section, we conduct robustness of our main results for an extended
sample of firms that also includes service sector firms. In addition to manufacturing firms with
2-digit SIC codes 20 to 39, we include all firms except for those in the financial services and
real estate (SIC codes 60-67), utility and public transportation (SIC codes 40-49), and public
service establishments (SIC codes 90-99). The results of the estimations shown in Table 14 are
consistent with the findings observed for manufacturing firms.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we examine whether stronger creditor rights reduce firms’ risk of default dur-
ing episodes of heightened economic policy uncertainty using a large cross-country firm-level
dataset. Consistent with earlier studies that argue for an inverse relationship between creditor
rights and firms’ risk-taking, we find a negative association between the strength of the insol-
vency framework and firms’ risk of debt default. Further, we find that stronger creditor rights
moderate the adverse effects of economic shocks and crises on firms’ likelihood of default.
Our findings are relevant for countries that seek to improve the institutional framework for
efficient financial contracts. The presence of stronger creditor rights may improve the outcomes
of both the contracting parties by dissuading managers and entrepreneurs from undertaking
riskier profitable investments that may increase the risk of debt default. While the passing up
of riskier and value-increasing investments may not be in the best interest of the shareholders,
in some instances, this can potentially reduce agency costs and improve contracting outcomes.
The conservative risk choices of managers could also be an outcome of a fear of loss of reputa-
tional capital if strong creditor rights result in a greater likelihood of a management change in
the event of a debt default.
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The results of the moderating effect of stronger creditor rights during economic policy
uncertainty suggest that the utility of having a sound insolvency regime extends beyond normal
economic conditions. Not only do creditor rights improve contracting outcomes, but they also
provide a conducive environment for the corporate sector to experience a lower risk of debt
distress during a crisis event. In such instances, firms are likely to actively manage business
risks in anticipation of a crisis so as to avoid entering bankruptcy.
Overall, our findings suggest that a stronger insolvency framework improves the stability
of the corporate sector and its ability to withstand government policy uncertainty and various
economic shocks, such as currency and sovereign debt crisis episodes. The improvement in
the credit discipline of firms can have important positive spillovers on the financial stability
of banks that lend to such firms. The implications of institutional factors on such bank-firm
linkages can be a direction for future research.
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Table 1: Variable description & data source
Variable Definition and construction Data source
Z-score Computed based on the Altman model of default risk
(Altman, 1968). The measure is computed as 1.2 ×
Working capital to assets + 1.4 × Retained earnings
to total assets + 3.3 × EBITDA to total assets + 0.6
× Market value of equity divided by book value of
liabilities + 0.999 × Sales to assets
Worldscope
Insol score An index that provides a score based on the time,
cost and outcome of the insolvency proceedings of
domestic entities in a country.
Doing Business World
Bank
Firm ethics An index that captures the level of corporate ethics in
interactions with politicians, bureaucrats, and other
firms
Global Competitive-
ness Index of the
World Economic
Forum
MSPD inv Market signal probability of default (ranging be-
tween 0 and 100) is a measure of default risk com-
puted using structural models. The measure is trans-
formed as 100 - Probabilty of default. Higher the
MSPD inv, lower the likelihood of default.
S&P Capital IQ
EPU An index that provides a measure of country-specific
economic policy uncertainty.
Economic Policy
uncertainty Index of
Baker, Bloom and
Davis (2016)
EPU shock A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
EPU is higher than one standard deviation above the
mean EPU and 0 otherwise
Authors’ calculations
Curr crisis A country-specific dummy variable that takes the
value 1 for all the years in which there was a cur-
rency crisis in a country and 0 otherwise.
Behavioral Finance
and Financial Stability
data from Harvard
Business School
Debt crisis A country-specific dummy variable that takes the
value 1 for all the years in which there was a
sovereign debt crisis in a country and 0 otherwise.
Behavioral Finance
and Financial Stability
data from Harvard
Business School
Sales gro(%) Growth in sales in a year Worldscope
Log Asset Natural logarithm of inflation adjusted total assets in
USD (WC07230) of the firm
Worldscope
Mkt leverage invRatio of market value of equity to total liabilities
(WC07210/( WC07230- WC07220))
Worldscope
Op CF Asset Operational cash flow divided by the total assets at
the end of the year of a firm (WC04201/WC02999)
Worldscope
M/B Ratio of market value of the equity to book value of
equity (WC07210/WC07220)
Worldscope
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – Continued from previous page
Variables Definition and Construction Data Source
Tangibility (%) Fixed assets to total assets of a firm
(WC02501/WC02999).
Worldscope
GDP growth
(%)
GDP growth of the country where the firm is head-
quartered.
World Bank WDI
Pvtcredit GDP
(%)
Ratio of private credit to the GDP of the country
where the firm is headquartered.
World Bank WDI
Log GDPPC Log of the annual GDP per capita of a country where
the firm is headquartered.
World Bank WDI
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Table 2: Summary statistics
P(x) refers to the xth percentile of the distribution. The definition of the variables is given in Table 1.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. P10 P90
Firm-specific
Z-score 103,576 3.19 3.32 2.53 -5.77 20.43 0.09 8.89
Log asset 103,576 12.55 1.87 12.44 8.38 17.53 9.60 15.94
Sales gro 103,576 6.26 25.09 5.42 -85.47 102.78 -31.26 45.63
Op CF Asset 103,576 0.06 0.10 0.07 -0.41 0.28 -0.09 0.19
M/B 103,576 2.31 2.90 1.41 0.18 19.94 0.34 7.15
Tangibility 103,576 0.31 0.18 0.29 0.01 0.77 0.05 0.64
Mkt leverage inv 103,576 3.05 4.96 1.36 0.06 32.20 0.18 11.98
Cash asset 103,159 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.68 0.01 0.41
MSPD inv 7,544 97.33 3.56 98.49 36.02 100.00 90.55 99.92
Country-specific
Insol score 103,576 69.15 27.92 82.55 0.14 100.00 27.36 99.83
Pvtcredit GDP 103,576 181.51 88.41 159.74 4.91 363.25 52.20 350.08
Log GDPPC 103,576 9.75 1.21 10.46 6.10 11.69 7.32 10.93
GDP growth 103,576 3.57 3.73 2.76 -17.00 25.56 -2.25 10.04
Curr crisis 99,784 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Debt crisis 98,047 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
EPU 88,577 123.11 50.64 119.53 27.00 364.83 65.82 209.98
EPU shock 88,577 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
EPU shock alt 88,577 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Firm ethics 79,499 4.93 0.87 5.02 2.74 6.78 3.61 6.21
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Table 3: Industry-specific Altman Z-score
The number of firm-year observations by SIC 2-digit industry codes for the manufacturing sector are
shown in the table. The mean and standard deviation of the Z-score by each industry group is also
shown.
SIC code Industry Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
20 Food & Kindred Products 3.28 2.90 10,571
21 Tobacco Products 5.68 4.90 229
22 Textile Mill Products 2.33 2.39 3,191
23 Apparel & Other Textile Products 3.33 3.01 2,294
24 Lumber & Wood Products 2.62 2.53 1,565
25 Furniture & Fixtures 2.87 2.43 1,077
26 Paper & Allied Products 2.48 2.23 3,315
27 Printing & Publishing 2.73 2.60 3,028
28 Chemical & Allied Products 3.54 4.04 16,278
29 Petroleum & Coal Products 3.14 2.19 1,318
30 Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products 3.03 2.95 2,942
31 Leather & Leather Products 4.42 4.00 560
32 Stone, Clay, & Glass Products 2.76 2.86 4,701
33 Primary Metal Industries 2.70 2.50 6,909
34 Fabricated Metal Products 2.95 2.34 4,458
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 3.17 2.94 11,967
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 3.36 3.81 14,069
37 Transportation Equipment 2.69 2.52 6,239
38 Instruments & Related Products 4.15 4.78 6,859
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 3.52 3.12 2,006
Overall 3.19 3.32 103,576
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Table 4: Insolvency framework and firms’ default risk
The dependent variable in the estimations is the Z-score of the firm in year t. A higher value of Z-score
indicates a lower likelihood of default. Large size is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for firms
with assets more than the median asset size in the sample and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors,
clustered at firm level are presented in the parenthesis. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The definition of each of the variables is given in Table 1.
All countries Excluding US & Japan
Dep var : Z-score (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Insol scoret−1 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Large size -0.654*** -0.629***
(0.119) (0.133)
Insol scoret−1 × Large size 0.003* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Log assett−1 -0.429*** -0.611*** -0.713***
(0.038) (0.044) (0.048)
Sales grot−1 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Op.CF Assett−1 6.933*** 6.991*** 6.880*** 7.198*** 7.123***
(0.276) (0.277) (0.277) (0.323) (0.324)
M/Bt−1 0.128*** 0.115*** 0.133*** 0.110*** 0.133***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Tangibilityt−1 -2.449*** -2.410*** -2.367*** -2.381*** -2.376***
(0.183) (0.181) (0.183) (0.203) (0.205)
Pvtcredit GDPt−1 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002* -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growtht−1 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Log GDPPCt−1 0.951*** 0.636*** 0.995*** 0.614***
(0.076) (0.069) (0.092) (0.085)
Constant 2.074*** 7.481*** 1.552** -2.764*** 2.642*** -2.312***
(0.165) (0.496) (0.663) (0.688) (0.771) (0.795)
Firm-year obs. 103,576 103,576 103,576 103,576 66,981 66,981
No. of firms 13,019 13,019 13,019 13,019 8,956 8956
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.642 0.669 0.672 0.669 0.679 0.675
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Table 5: Economic shocks and firms’ default risk
The dependent variable in the estimations is the Z-score of the firm in year t. A higher value of Z-score
indicates a lower likelihood of default. Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level are presented in the
parenthesis. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The definition
of each of the variables is given in Table 1.
All countries Excluding US & Japan
Dep var : Z-score (1) (2) (3) (4)
Insol scoret−1 0.008** 0.008*** 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
EPU shockt−1 -0.157** -0.225***
(0.071) (0.074)
Insol scoret−1 × EPU shockt−1 0.005*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001)
EPU shock altt−1 -0.390*** -0.435***
(0.060) (0.066)
Insol scoret−1 × EPU shock altt−1 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Log assett−1 -0.651*** -0.651*** -0.791*** -0.791***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.056) (0.056)
Sales grot−1 0.001** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Op.CF Assett−1 7.031*** 7.024*** 7.327*** 7.340***
(0.315) (0.315) (0.393) (0.392)
M/Bt−1 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.102*** 0.103***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Tangibilityt−1 -2.325*** -2.317*** -2.279*** -2.250***
(0.210) (0.210) (0.244) (0.245)
Pvtcredit GDPt−1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growtht−1 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.012** 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Log GDPPCt−1 1.016*** 1.067*** 1.106*** 1.102***
(0.081) (0.082) (0.099) (0.102)
Constant 1.491** 0.923 2.819*** 2.885***
(0.708) (0.713) (0.840) (0.858)
Firm-year obs. 88,554 88,554 51,947 51,947
No. of firms 11,210 11,210 7,146 7,146
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.672 0.672 0.681 0.681
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Table 6: Size-effects in firms’ response to creditor rights
The dependent variable in the estimations is the Z-score of the firm in year t. A higher value of Z-score
indicates a lower likelihood of default. Large size is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for firms
with assets more than the median asset size in the sample and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors,
clustered at firm level are presented in the parenthesis. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The definition of each of the variables is given in Table 1.
All countries Excluding US & Japan
Dep var : Z-score (1) (2) (3) (4)
Insol scoret−1 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
EPU shockt−1 0.253** 0.218*
(0.120) (0.123)
Insol scoret−1 × EPU shockt−1 0.000 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Large size -0.720*** -0.829*** -0.675*** -0.774***
(0.137) (0.139) (0.155) (0.159)
Insol scoret−1 × Large size 0.004** 0.005*** 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
EPU shockt−1 × Large size -0.714*** -0.686*** -0.796*** -0.725***
(0.149) (0.170) (0.153) (0.172)
Insol scoret−1 × EPU shockt−1 × Large size 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Sales grot−1 0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Op.CF Assett−1 6.864*** 6.787*** 7.161*** 7.074***
(0.315) (0.315) (0.396) (0.390)
M/Bt−1 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.125***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Tangibilityt−1 -2.261*** -2.415*** -2.257*** -2.406***
(0.212) (0.215) (0.247) (0.251)
Pvtcredit GDPt−1 -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
GDP growtht−1 0.024*** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.006)
Log GDPPCt−1 0.716*** 0.730***
(0.073) (0.091)
Constant -3.395*** 3.731*** -3.164*** 46.896***
(0.749) (0.761) (0.883) (11.046)
Firm-year obs. 88,554 88,545 51,947 51,938
No. of firms 11,210 11,210 7,146 7,146
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Adj. R2 0.669 0.678 0.677 0.686
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Table 7: Alternative measure of default risk
The dependent variable in the estimations is the MSPD inv of the firm in year t. A high value of
MSPD inv, which ranges from 0 to 100, indicates a lower probability of default. Robust standard
errors, clustered at firm level are presented in the parenthesis. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The definition of each of the variables is given in Table 1.
All countries Excluding US & Japan
Dep var : MSPD inv (1) (2) (3) (4)
Insol scoret−1 0.007 0.019 -0.015 0.008
(0.027) (0.026) (0.031) (0.029)
EPU shockt−1 -1.520*** -1.746***
(0.379) (0.446)
Insol scoret−1 × EPU shockt−1 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.006)
EPU shock altt−1 -1.635*** -1.818***
(0.388) (0.486)
Insol scoret−1 × EPU shock altt−1 0.016*** 0.015**
(0.005) (0.006)
Log assett−1 -0.284 -0.267 -0.338 -0.332
(0.235) (0.236) (0.325) (0.324)
Sales grot−1 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Op.CF Assett−1 1.086 1.052 0.977 0.979
(0.973) (0.971) (1.635) (1.632)
M/Bt−1 -0.047** -0.044** -0.060** -0.061**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025)
Tangibilityt−1 -0.765 -0.788 -0.63 -0.69
(0.886) (0.887) (1.144) (1.144)
Pvtcredit GDPt−1 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
GDP growtht−1 -0.001 -0.007 0.026 0.026
(0.034) (0.036) (0.042) (0.044)
Log GDPPCt−1 0.727* 0.740* 1.664** 1.732**
(0.436) (0.444) (0.768) (0.752)
Constant 90.580*** 89.498*** 85.293*** 83.471***
(2.882) (2.922) (5.604) (5.437)
Firm-year obs. 6,432 6,432 3,837 3,837
No. of firms 1,617 1,617 974 974
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.669 0.67 0.651 0.653
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Table 8: Alternative measure of economic shocks - Currency and debt crisis
The dependent variable in the estimations is the Z-score of the firm in year t. A higher value of Z-score
indicates a lower likelihood of default. Curr crisis andDebt crisis are dummy variables that captures
the presence of a currency and sovereign debt default in a country. Robust standard errors, clustered at
firm level are presented in the parenthesis. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% respectively. The definition of each of the variables is given in Table 1.
All countries Excluding US & Japan
Dep V ar : Z-score (1) (2) (3) (4)
Insol scoret−1 0.007*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Curr crisist−1 -0.481*** -0.442***
(0.067) (0.077)
Insol scoret−1 × Curr crisist−1 0.006*** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001)
Debt crisist−1 -0.500* -0.588*
(0.299) (0.308)
Insol scoret−1 ×Debt crisist−1 0.023** 0.024**
(0.010) (0.011)
Log assett−1 -0.600*** -0.610*** -0.714*** -0.720***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.049) (0.050)
Sales grot−1 0.001* 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Op.CF Assett−1 7.050*** 6.950*** 7.291*** 7.120***
(0.284) (0.286) (0.335) (0.339)
M/Bt−1 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.108*** 0.110***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Tangibilityt−1 -2.402*** -2.390*** -2.387*** -2.370***
(0.189) (0.191) (0.214) (0.217)
Pvtcredit GDPt−1 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growtht−1 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.018*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Log GDPPCt−1 1.014*** 0.967*** 1.069*** 1.051***
(0.080) (0.079) (0.095) (0.097)
Constant 0.911 1.560** 2.005** 2.412***
(0.693) (0.673) (0.780) (0.780)
Firm-year obs. 99,778 98,041 63,180 61,433
No. of firms 12,522 12,345 8,459 8,282
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.677 0.677 0.688 0.688
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Table 9: Continuous measure of uncertainty
The dependent variable in columns (1), (2) and (4) is Z-score, and in column (3) is MSPD inv. A
higher value of Z-score indicates a lower likelihood of default. Large size is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 for firms with assets more than the median asset size in the sample and 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level are presented in the parenthesis. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The definition of each of the variables is
given in Table 1.
All countries Excluding US & Japan
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Insol scoret−1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
EPUt−1 -0.429*** -0.226** -0.490*** -0.266**
(0.052) (0.101) (0.061) (0.111)
Insol scoret−1 × EPUt−1 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Large size -0.379* -0.318
(0.194) (0.219)
Insol scoret−1 × Large size 0.000 -0.003
(0.003) (0.004)
EPUt−1 × Large size -0.345*** -0.385***
(0.121) (0.134)
Insol scoret−1 × EPUt−1 × Large size 0.004** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Log assett−1 -0.647*** -0.788***
(0.050) (0.056)
Sales grot−1 0.001** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Op.CF Assett−1 7.030*** 6.868*** 7.346*** 7.186***
(0.314) (0.315) (0.392) (0.395)
M/Bt−1 0.111*** 0.129*** 0.103*** 0.129***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Tangibilityt−1 -2.343*** -2.273*** -2.260*** -2.228***
(0.210) (0.213) (0.244) (0.247)
Pvtcredit GDPt−1 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growtht−1 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.009 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Log GDPPCt−1 1.131*** 0.830*** 1.208*** 0.831***
(0.082) (0.074) (0.101) (0.093)
Constant 0.68 -4.359*** 2.367*** -3.799***
(0.713) (0.786) (0.846) (0.926)
Firm-year obs. 88,554 88,554 51,947 51,947
No. of firms 11,210 11,210 7,146 7,146
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.672 0.669 0.682 0.677
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Table 10: Interaction of insolvency framework and governance
The dependent variable in the estimations is the Z-score of the firm in year t. A higher value of Z-
score indicates a lower likelihood of default. Firm ethics is a country-level index that measures the
ethical practices of firms based in a country in dealing with various stakeholders. Robust standard errors,
clustered at firm level are presented in the parenthesis. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The definition of each of the variables is given in Table 1.
All countries Excluding US & Japan
Dep var : Z-score (1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm ethicst−1 0.308*** 0.100 0.383*** 0.159
(0.095) (0.131) (0.104) (0.150)
Insol scoret−1 0.031*** 0.016* 0.033*** 0.012
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Insol scoret−1 × Firm ethicst−1 -0.006*** -0.003 -0.006*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
EPU shockt−1 -2.086*** -2.197***
(0.484) (0.504)
Firm ethicst−1 × EPU shockt−1 0.449*** 0.458***
(0.116) (0.120)
Insol scoret−1 × EPU shockt−1 0.027*** 0.030***
(0.007) (0.007)
Insol scoret−1 × Firm ethicst−1 × EPU shockt−1 -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
Log assett−1 -0.708*** -0.734*** -0.804*** -0.859***
(0.054) (0.060) (0.059) (0.069)
Sales grot−1 0.001* 0.001 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Op CF Assett−1 5.859*** 5.915*** 6.048*** 6.219***
(0.308) (0.355) (0.367) (0.455)
M/Bt−1 0.091*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.084***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Tangibilityt−1 -2.559*** -2.576*** -2.587*** -2.648***
(0.207) (0.242) (0.233) (0.285)
Pvtcredit GDPt−1 -0.001 -0.002** 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growtht−1 0.012*** 0.008 0.010** 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Log GDPPCt−1 0.575*** 0.651*** 0.582*** 0.664***
(0.092) (0.104) (0.106) (0.122)
Constant 5.327*** 6.033*** 6.225*** 7.458***
(0.843) (0.960) (0.953) (1.114)
Firm-year obs. 79,152 67,197 53,232 41,278
No. of firms 11,865 10,160 8,371 6,670
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.711 0.711 0.714 0.715
35
Table 11: External finance dependence
The dependent variable in the estimations is the Z-score of the firm in year t. A higher value of Z-score
indicates a lower likelihood of default. The estimation sample is divided into two sub groups, High
Dep. (Low Dep.) based on above median (below median) external finance dependence of the firm’s
industry. Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level are presented in the parenthesis. ‘***’, ‘**’ and
‘*’ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The definition of each of the variables is
given in Table 1.
All countries Excluding US & Japan
High Dep. Low Dep. High Dep. Low Dep.
Dep var : Z-score (1) (2) (3) (4)
Insol scoret−1 0.013** 0.003 0.009 0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
EPU shockt−1 -0.207* -0.117 -0.309*** -0.153
(0.107) (0.096) (0.111) (0.100)
Insol scoret−1 × EPU shockt−1 0.006*** 0.004** 0.009*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log assett−1 -0.731*** -0.562*** -0.887*** -0.678***
(0.073) (0.066) (0.077) (0.079)
Sales grot−1 0.002** 0.001 0.003*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Op CF Assett−1 7.102*** 6.966*** 7.596*** 7.057***
(0.470) (0.413) (0.581) (0.524)
M/Bt−1 0.099*** 0.123*** 0.085*** 0.121***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Tangibilityt−1 -2.233*** -2.400*** -2.070*** -2.483***
(0.312) (0.273) (0.352) (0.329)
Pvtcredit GDPt−1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growtht−1 0.033*** 0.014** 0.015 0.009
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Log GDPPCt−1 1.176*** 0.822*** 1.281*** 0.911***
(0.119) (0.107) (0.146) (0.131)
Constant 0.647 2.533*** 2.438** 3.222***
(1.007) (0.976) (1.219) (1.125)
Firm-year obs. 42,159 46,395 25,548 26,399
No. of firms 5,445 5,765 3,542 3,604
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.657 0.69 0.673 0.693
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Table 12: Impacts on market leverage and cash flows under improved creditor rights
The dependent variable in the first-stage estimations shown in column (1) is the Cash asset and in col-
umn (2) is theMkt leverage inv. The dependent variable in the second-stage regression in column (3)
is the Z-score of the firm and in column (4) is the Z-score without the market value leverage component.
A higher value of Z-score indicates a lower likelihood of default. Robust standard errors, clustered at
firm level are presented in the parenthesis. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% respectively. The definition of each of the variables is given in Table 1.
Stage 1 Stage 2
Cash asset Mkt leverage inv Z-score Z-score
w/o leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Insol scoret−1 0.011 0.030***
(0.009) (0.004)
Insol scoret−1 × EPUt−1 0.006 0.006***
(0.004) (0.001)
EPUt−1 -0.664*** -0.358*** -0.034 -0.017
(0.217) (0.089) (0.097) (0.080)
Mkt leverage invt 0.872*** 0.270**
(0.160) (0.132)
Cash assett -0.235 -0.186
(0.293) (0.241)
Log assett−1 -1.916*** -1.186*** -0.06 0.035
(0.074) (0.030) (0.396) (0.327)
Sales grot−1 -0.011*** -0.003*** 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Op CF Assett−1 6.525*** 5.612*** 3.662*** 3.471***
(0.446) (0.182) (1.159) (0.956)
M/Bt−1 0.052*** 0.215*** -0.052** -0.054***
(0.013) (0.005) (0.022) (0.018)
Tangibilityt−1 -21.046*** -2.396*** -5.022 -3.98
(0.386) (0.158) (5.814) (4.798)
Pvtcredit GDPt−1 0.018*** -0.001 0.004 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
GDP growtht−1 -0.056*** -0.036*** 0.000 0.001
(0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.010)
Log GDPPCt−1 0.871*** 1.287*** -0.187 -0.232**
(0.119) (0.049) (0.114) (0.094)
Firm-year obs. 88,174 88,174 88,174 88,168
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 13: Extended measure of Insolvency
The dependent variable in the estimations is the Z-score of the firm in year t. A higher value of Z-score
indicates a lower likelihood of default. Insol score ext is an extended measure of insolvency score
described in the text. Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level are presented in the parenthesis.
‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The definition of each of
the variables is given in Table 1.
All countries Excluding US & Japan
Dep var Z-score MSPD inv Z-score MSPD inv
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Insol score extt−1 0.002 -0.024 -0.004 -0.028
(0.003) (0.018) (0.003) (0.022)
EPU shockt−1 -0.141** -1.521*** -0.203*** -1.775***
(0.071) (0.380) (0.074) (0.459)
Insol score extt−1 × EPU shockt−1 0.005*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006)
Log assett−1 -0.651*** -0.281 -0.792*** -0.337
(0.050) (0.235) (0.056) (0.325)
Sales grot−1 0.001** -0.001 0.002*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Op CF Assett−1 7.029*** 1.084 7.330*** 0.997
(0.315) (0.973) (0.392) (1.634)
M/Bt−1 0.111*** -0.046** 0.103*** -0.059**
(0.009) (0.020) (0.010) (0.025)
Tangibilityt−1 -2.326*** -0.777 -2.280*** -0.655
(0.210) (0.886) (0.244) (1.146)
Pvtcredit GDPt−1 -0.004*** 0.016*** -0.003*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
GDP growtht−1 0.023*** 0.004 0.013** 0.03
(0.005) (0.034) (0.006) (0.042)
Log GDPPCt−1 1.024*** 0.802* 1.098*** 1.514**
(0.081) (0.434) (0.100) (0.754)
Constant 1.876*** 91.938*** 3.369*** 87.284***
(0.705) (2.653) (0.843) (5.868)
Firm-year obs. 88,554 6,432 51,947 3,837
No. of firms 11,210 1,617 7,146 974
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.672 0.670 0.681 0.651
38
Table 14: Extended sample with service-sector firms
The dependent variable in the estimations is the Z-score of the firm in year t. A higher value of Z-score
indicates a lower likelihood of default. Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level are presented in the
parenthesis. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The definition
of each of the variables is given in Table 1.
All countries Excluding US & Japan
Dep var : Z-score (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Insol scoret−1 0.005** 0.003 0.003 0.004** 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
EPUt−1 -0.051 -0.108*
(0.061) (0.065)
Insol scoret−1 × EPUt−1 0.003** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
EPU shock altt−1 -0.277*** -0.309***
(0.052) (0.056)
Insol scoret−1 × EPU shock altt−1 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Log assett−1 -0.608*** -0.626*** -0.626*** -0.713*** -0.766*** -0.766***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.047) (0.047)
Sales grot−1 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Op CF Assett−1 6.674*** 6.747*** 6.743*** 6.837*** 7.016*** 7.022***
(0.207) (0.232) (0.232) (0.244) (0.290) (0.290)
M/Bt−1 0.100*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.102***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Tangibilityt−1 -2.095*** -1.982*** -1.981*** -2.027*** -1.869*** -1.852***
(0.150) (0.176) (0.176) (0.169) (0.208) (0.208)
Pvtcredit GDPt−1 -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growtht−1 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.008* 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Log GDPPCt−1 1.015*** 1.059*** 1.100*** 1.095*** 1.169*** 1.177***
(0.066) (0.070) (0.070) (0.080) (0.087) (0.088)
Constant 0.544 0.561 0.116 1.318** 1.534** 1.504**
(0.563) (0.614) (0.615) (0.662) (0.742) (0.749)
Firm-year obs. 183,266 158,031 158,031 115,609 90,364 90,364
No. of firms 24,725 21,499 21,499 16,569 13,342 13,342
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.663 0.664 0.664 0.655 0.655 0.655
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A. Appendix
Table A1: Country statistics
The number of firm-year observations are shown in the table.
Country name Obs. Country name Obs.
Argentina 349 Lithuania 74
Australia 1,701 Luxembourg 96
Austria 457 Latvia 90
Belgium 487 Morocco 222
Brazil 1,064 Mexico 525
Canada 1,032 Mauritius 26
Switzerland 1,381 Malaysia 4,527
Chile 651 Nigeria 209
China 15,971 Netherlands 461
Cote d’Ivoire 82 Norway 317
Colombia 153 New Zealand 123
Czech Republic 37 Peru 421
Germany 3,027 Philippines 411
Denmark 615 Poland 1,219
Egypt, Arab Rep. 570 Portugal 184
Spain 705 Russia 659
Estonia 35 Singapore 1,963
Finland 850 Serbia 226
France 2,898 Slovak Republic 38
United Kingdom 3,361 Slovenia 105
Ghana 53 Sweden 1,416
Greece 1,089 Thailand 1,579
Hong Kong SAR, China 3,092 Tunisia 142
Indonesia 1,272 Turkey 1,816
India 5,925 United States 15,520
Ireland 306 Venezuela 66
Iceland 49 South Africa 840
Italy 1,339 Zambia 29
Japan 21,021 Zimbabwe 15
Kenya 92 Total 103,576
Sri Lanka 593
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